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abstract: in Logiques des mondes, alain badiou has produced a sequel to his magnum opus Being 
and Event. whereas Being and Event primarily restricted itself to the relationship between ontology 
and the event, mathematics and poetry, the new book seriously extends and revises certain of its 
predecessor’s propositions in order to construct a logic of different ‘worlds’. this article outlines 
some of the major doctrines, arguments, and motivations for the new work, as well as several 
points of possible difficulty.
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‘we know that mathematicians care no more for logic than logicians 
for mathematics. the two eyes of exact science are mathematics and 
logic: the mathematical sect puts out the logical eye, the logical sect 
puts out the mathematical eye, each believing that it can see better 
with one eye than with two’.
—augustus de morgan
preamble
alain badiou’s most recent book Logiques des mondes presents itself as a sequel to Being 
. this article draws on the following works of badiou:
alain badiou, Logiques des mondes: L’être et l’événement, 2, paris, seuil, 2006 (low).
alain badiou, On Beckett, trans. and ed. n. power and a. toscano, manchester, Clinamen, 2003 (ob).
alain badiou, Being and Event, trans. o. Feltham, london, Continuum, 2005 (be).
alain badiou, Briefings on Existence: A Short Treatise on Transitory Ontology, trans. n. madarasz, new York, 
sunY, 2006 (to). 
alain badiou, Conditions, paris, seuil, 992 (C).
alain badiou, Le Siècle, paris, seuil, 2005 (ls).
alain badiou, Théorie du Sujet, paris, seuil, 982 (ts).
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and Event. but what is a philosophical sequel? what are the conceptual consequences for 
a philosophy for which a sequel has come to seem necessary? to answer this question, i 
begin by identifying certain key features of badiou’s position in be, particularly regard-
ing the ‘absoluteness’ of philosophy’s conditions. these conditions—science, love, art 
and politics—prove absolute insofar as they are inseparably contingent in their emergence, 
immanent to their situations, self-supporting in their elaboration, indifferent to all existing 
forms of self-interest, egalitarian in their address, and restrained in their extension. philoso-
phy is a transliteration of the singular injunctions delivered by these conditions, and the 
recomposition of these effects in a system. several aspects of be, however, harbour cer-
tain difficulties. For example, in regards to the details of subjective variation, the relation 
between events and their sites, the local status of bodies and situations, and, above all, in 
leaving aside the relation between mathematics and logic. in Logiques des mondes (the title 
translated here as Logics of  Worlds), badiou confronts these difficulties. using category 
theory, badiou tries to forge a ‘grand logic’ able to account for the specificity of worlds 
and the local apparition of events, without abandoning his doctrine of the transmun-
dane nature of truths. this review argues that the attempt—though overwhelmingly 
brilliant—is confusing, and its execution not altogether effective. low wavers because 
it revivifies, despite itself, Hegelian elements that, in the absence of the Hegelian dialec-
tic, entail treating conditions as examples. when reduced to examples, truths are no longer 
conditions of but objects for philosophy; as objects, however, these truths cannot support 
philosophy in the way that it requires; without such support, philosophy collapses into a 
‘theory’ of the logic of appearances. or, to put this another way, low is an extra-philo-
sophical work, concerned to delineate the possibility of such situations as the ontological, 
rather than working directly with such situations itself. symptoms of such a philosophical 
‘extraneousness’ are evident in the book’s escalating rhetoric, its proliferation of exam-
ples, its unclarified structure, and its creation of new problems in the guise of resolving 
old ones. in a word, low is at once too Hegelian and not Hegelian enough. unlike be, 
low no longer simply attends to absolutes, but tarries with variabilities.
i. WOrLdS’ LOgiCS: BEiNg ANd EvENT ; or, pHilosopHY’s SEquELA
the first thing you notice about low is its size. in its original French edition, be 
was just over 560 pages, beautifully printed on heavy paper. low is 630 pages long, 
and the paper and printing seem thinner. the card of low’s cover is significantly more 
supple than the cover of be. You may also be struck that the stark minimalist cover 
of be has here been ornamented with the reproduction of a beautiful Hubert robert 
painting, of figures bathing before a neoclassical folly in dark woods, the sky rift by sun 
behind the angling clouds. be appeared in the series L’ordre philosophique, then edited by 
François wahl; low appears in the same series, which is now directed by badiou and 
barbara Cassin. it may or may not be of significance that seuil were originally retailing 
be for 200 francs, and low for 30 euros (though i got mine for 28.50 euros). times 
have clearly changed.
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the differences aren’t due only to design issues and a major currency shift. the title 
reads: Logiques des mondes: L’être et l’événement, 2. this literally translates as Logics of  worlds: 
being and event, 2. initially, i was tempted to twist this into Worlds’ Logics. why? First, be-
cause ‘de’ in French can be perfectly well rendered as an english possessive, retaining 
the irreducible ambiguity of the genitive. second, Worlds’ Logics is such a rebarbative 
syntagm that it at once detains a force of thought (you do have to think about it), and, as 
such, is also a reminder that this title has a very particular and significant sense. For me, 
it suggests something about the pluralization of both ‘worlds’ and ‘logics’ that ‘logics of 
worlds’ may not. note the title proper is without articles, definite or indefinite. third, it 
is an opportunity to offer contemporary readers a rare example of the correct use of the 
apostrophe. in the end, however, i have submitted to the most straightforward render-
ing of the title in english—a rendering that seems to have been peculiarly unpopular to 
date—but which at least mimes the form of the original and, as the acronym low, is 
much richer than wl.2
translation issues aside, the next thing you might notice about low is its peculiar 
organization. if you turn to the ‘table’ of contents, you are immediately confronted 
by a labyrinth of peculiar divisions: a preface, seven books (each titled) and a Con-
clusion, each division of noticeably variable length and further subdivided; there are 
also scholia, technical notes, appendices, avant-propos, information, commentaries and 
digressions, statements, dictionaries, bibliography, index and iconography; further sub-
divisions, bristling with titles, sometimes even the same title repeated in different books, 
sometimes numbered, sometimes not (e.g., ‘existence’, ‘atomic logic’, ‘the inexistent’, 
etc.). 
For anyone familiar with the structure and vocabulary of be, many of the headings 
here will appear unfamiliar or anomalous. be is classically and minimally structured. it 
begins with an account of the philosophical conjuncture into which be is intervening, 
and then proceeds, in an orderly fashion—that is, at once logically, chronologically and 
thematically—from plato to lacan, interspersed with what is essentially a course in set 
theory ontology. low, on the other hand, is not ordered classically, chronologically, 
minimally, or, to the naked eye, logically. in the preface alone, one finds, alongside a 
polemic opposing ‘democratic materialism’ and the ‘materialist dialectic’, discussions of 
prime numbers chez the greeks and chez nous, of the painted horses of the Chauvet-pont-
d’arc grotto and picasso, of Virgil and berlioz, of radical Chinese political tracts. it is 
surely significant that low does not, as did its predecessor, situate itself in a philosophi-
cal conjuncture, but in a very generalized, global cultural moment (that of ‘democratic 
2. see, for example, a. toscano and r. brassier, ‘editors’ note’ in a. badiou, Theoretical Writings, london, 
Continuum, 2004, pp. ix, x, where they speak of The Logics of  Worlds, whereas norman madarasz has re-
course to World Logics in his translation of badiou’s ‘preface’ in to, p. xi. as for steve Corcoran and bruno 
bosteels, they give Logics of  Worlds in their translation of ‘logics of the site’ in diacritics, vol. 33, nos. 3-4, 
2003, pp. 4-50. moreover, in their unpublished ‘postface: aleatory rationalism’ (written 2003) to Theoreti-
cal Writings, toscano and brassier do indeed speak of Logics of  Worlds. this already gives us, bizarrely, four 
possibilities for what seems an eminently straightforward title. david bowie fans will surely appreciate the 
acronymic allusion here to his magnificent album of the same name.
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materialism’). as one progresses through the book, the logic of the presentation of cat-
egory theory begins to take precedence, until, finally, the formalisms tail off to end with 
propositions entirely in natural language. there is certainly a kind of structure here, but 
it is less clearly rigorous and less self-evident than its predecessor’s.
i will come back to this question of structure more directly below, but i wish to 
broach it here by asking a particular, if perhaps unusual, question: What does it mean 
to write a philosophical sequel? in the case of Hollywood, the necessity for a sequel is very 
clear: it is audience receipts. in the case of philosophy, the necessity for a sequel is, on 
the contrary, highly obscure. it’s not usually sales that determine success. as david 
Hume notoriously remarked of his own Treatise on Human Nature, ‘it fell dead-born from 
the press’. such a lack of public approbation, however, is hardly an argument against the 
value of a book (especially not one that immanuel Kant said woke him from his ‘dog-
matic slumbers’).3 still, aside from metaphors of continuing to rudely awaken people 
despite your demise, it’s hard to know what constitutes philosophical success, let alone 
what sort of philosophical success might demand a sequel. if a philosophical work is a 
success, surely that precludes a sequel? You’ve said what needed to be said: you can now 
spend the rest of your life reiterating, rewriting, or recanting your program. if you add a 
proposed second volume, that hardly constitutes a sequel; a systematic work in no mat-
ter how many volumes is not a sequel. in philosophy, a sequel perhaps implies that the 
‘original’ was in some way a failure, somehow deficient, requiring supplementation or 
correction—and yet, somehow, the intervention you can’t help but follow.
You may get something of this sense from Hegel’s problems with sealing up his sys-
tem. in his ‘preface to the First edition’ of the Science of  Logic, he writes:
as regards the external relation, it was intended that the first part of the System 
of  Science which contains the Phenomenology should be followed by a second part 
containing logic and the two concrete [realen] sciences, the philosophy of nature 
and the philosophy of spirit, which would complete the system of philosophy. but 
the necessary expansion which logic itself has demanded has induced me to have 
this part published separately; it thus forms the first sequel to the Phenomenology of  
Spirit in an expanded arrangement of the system. it will later be followed by an 
exposition of the two concrete philosophical sciences mentioned.4
the philosophical system that presents the absolute system finds itself forced into a 
‘necessary expansion’, determined by ‘logic itself ’. as martin Heidegger glosses the 
transmogrification: 
soon after the appearance of the Phenomenology of  Spirit in 807, Hegel began 
publishing a work known as the Logic. the first volume of this work appeared in 
3. Jon roffe has alerted me to the fact that Kant may never have read Hume’s Treatise, but relied on second-
ary sources for his information about the problem Hume raises in regards to causation. i would like to take 
this opportunity, too, to thank both roffe and a. J. bartlett for their comments on an earlier draft of this 
review.
4. g.w. F. Hegel, The Science of  Logic, trans. a.V. miller, atlantic Highlands nJ, Humanities press interna-
tional, 996, pp. 28-9.
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82/3, and the second volume in 86. but the Logic did not appear as the second 
part of the system of science. or is this Logic, in accord with the matter at issue 
therein, the remaining second part of the system? Yes and no….5
‘Yes and no’: what i want to underline at this point is that Hegel, a philosopher notorious 
for enforcing a total and systematic approach to philosophy, is himself forced to alter 
his declared presentation so significantly that the system that the original purports to 
present must itself be reorganized according to new criteria that retrospectively trans-
form its essence. Yet this very transformation continues to pursue its singular divagation 
in the wake of the original. i will return below to the consequences of Hegel’s systemic-
reconstruction-in-process. Here, however, i want to mark just how tightly the problem 
of the philosophical sequel is articulated with, first, the problem of the absolute and, 
second, with the problem of system. one might suggest that sequels tend to force out 
an impossibility of articulation between the two, as they betray the intervention of new 
concepts. a sequel makes its predecessor the one that it was not (or had not been). the 
whole—or at least its non-existence or its impossibility—is at stake in a sequel.
which is why it is not surprising that philosophy begins with a man who writes 
nothing but sequels. the same action hero returns, again and again, hurling himself 
enthusiastically into dangerous and extreme situations; one rediscovers familiar figures 
and locations, which are then rendered uncanny by the events in which they are sum-
moned to participate; a battery of narrative special-effects are placed in the service of a 
ceaseless conceptual warfare. all of which makes the platonic dialogues extremely dif-
ficult to decipher. is socrates the same character throughout the dialogues? How does 
he change? why? How close a resemblance does he bear to the ‘historical’ socrates? es-
pecially since this platonic character socrates dies, then returns to life, to circumstances 
which are painfully fictional or rankly impossible. what are the consequences for the 
elaboration of concepts given this swarming of personae? and so on. the complexity of 
the relation between continuity and rupture in the presentation and capture of concepts 
is not just implicit, but itself exposed and put to work in and by such a serial presenta-
tion, to the extent that ‘continuity’ and ‘rupture’ must themselves be re-conceptualized 
in order to fulfil the demands of philosophy.6
nor is it then surprising, given alain badiou’s declared platonism, that low, his 
most recent book, presents itself as a sequel to his indisputable magnum opus, be. as the 
5. m. Heidegger, Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit, trans. p. emad and K. maly. bloomington and indianapolis, 
indiana university press, 988, p. 2. as Heidegger continues, ‘why is the title System omitted as early as 
82? because between 807 and 82, a transformation was already underway. the sign of the initial trans-
formation in the idea of the system can be seen in the fact that the Logic not only loses the main heading but 
also stands separately, by itself—not because it turned out to be too detailed, but because the Phenomenology 
is to take on a different function and position in the fluctuating arrangement of the system. because the 
Phenomenology is no longer the first part of the system, the Logic is no longer its second part’, p. 4. indeed, the 
entire ‘introduction’ is of pertinence here, pp. -42. i would like to thank paul ashton for reminding me of 
these passages, as well as for his detailed commentary on these issues (personal communication).
6. to follow this line of thought, could then not aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics be thought according to 
a logic of the sequel?
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back cover blurb puts it, low ‘is conceived as a sequel [une suite] to his previous ‘great’ 
book of philosophy’. why? badiou himself notes that, despite several of his books prov-
ing genuine ‘bestsellers’ in the wake of be, this economic success was no index of philo-
sophical triumph. on the contrary, his doubts only grew about several aspects of his 
own work. was badiou about to expel himself from his own paradise? in the ‘preface’ to 
the new english translation of Court traité d’ontologie transitoire, badiou puts it like this: 
From the middle of the 990s, what slowly grew to become most evident to me 
were the difficulties of my undertaking. Happy times were coming to a close. i told 
myself: ‘the idea of event is fundamental. but the theory i propose on what the 
event is the name of is not clear’. or: ‘the ontological extension of mathematics 
is certain. but, then, what about logic?’ many other doubts and questions ensued 
(to, ix-x).7
what is striking about the problems of philosophical sequels (or, if you’re happy to 
contract a epidemiological pun, the sequela) is that they constitute a return to oneself. Jacques 
lacan notoriously called for ‘a return to Freud’, meaning—not a return to dogmas or 
doctrines of the master—but to the impasses of the Freudian text. it is to the turbulent 
traces of Freud’s own failed solutions to the unprecedented deadlocks his discovery of 
the unconscious generated that lacan attends. so when, in be, badiou proposes the 
clarion-call of a ‘return to plato’, his call should be taken in this vein. a return to plato 
is not just a return to the platonic dogmas, but to the rifts and opacities of the platonic 
text; rifts and opacities, however, that would have been unthinkable before plato’s ‘inter-
ruption’ of poetry by mathematics. 
Yet both plato and Freud were, for the reasons i have been implying, already caught 
up in their own process of return to their own earlier work, and it is this returning—to 
the impasses thrown up by a founding intervention—that constitutes the development 
of their work. a return always returns to return. but it does so on the basis of an inter-
ruption that exceeds any sufficient reason. in plato, this interruption is called socrates; 
in Freud, it is called the symptom. which makes a sequel different from just another 
book by the same author: it is a return to one’s own failures to have thought what 
renders possible and necessary such a return.8
7. see a. J. bartlett’s review of to elsewhere in this issue of Cosmos and History. as bartlett (and others) have 
noted, the english in to can be imprecise and confusing.
8. one should then note the perhaps surprising profusion of sequels in contemporary european philoso-
phy: i think immediately of michel Foucault’s History of  Sexuality volumes, as well as michel serres’s Hermès 
sequence, deleuze and guattari’s Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, giorgio agamben’s Homo Sacer, rem-
nants of  Auschwitz and State of  Exception, etc. badiou himself has a little sequence of volumes entitled Circon-
stances (collections of little articles that have appeared elsewhere), and speaks of his own temptation to pub-
lish a Conditions 2 (cf. ‘preface’ to to, p. xi). but it’s necessary to be careful: not every numbered sequence 
constitutes a sequel in the sense i am speaking of here ; nor are unnumbered titles not necessarily sequels. 
badiou : ‘let us note that Briefings on Existence. Short Treatise on Transitory Ontology is part of a trilogy, which is 
already more tentative than the unity of the Conditions volume. published simultaneously with it was the Petit 
manuel d’inesthétique….there was also the Abrégé de métapolitique’, to, p. xi. moreover, a sequel is not a ‘care-
fully orchestrated succession of works dealing with problems in a clearly discernible sequence, as in berg-
son’, ‘author’s preface’ in Theoretical Writings, p. xiii. and a proposed sequel may never appear at all: where’s 
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one could give this sequaciousness of philosophy a number of different names, such 
as those that badiou himself has explored in some detail elsewhere. in Le Siècle, he gives 
Chapter 8 the title of ‘anabasis’, drawn from a famous memoir of Xenophon, student 
of socrates, contemporary of plato. badiou writes: ‘in the trajectory it names, anabasis 
leaves undecided the parts respectively allotted to disciplined invention and uncertain 
wandering. in so doing, it constitutes a disjunctive synthesis of will and wandering. af-
ter all, the greek word already attests to this undecidability, since the verb αναβανειν 
(“to anabase,” as it were), means both “to embark” and “to return.”’9 if badiou here 
invokes anabasis in the context of a discussion of saint-John perse and paul Celan, it is 
also present—if not named as such—in the discussion in low, under the heading of 
‘referents and operations of the faithful subject’:
let’s suppose that, following the revolt of a handful of gladiators around spartacus 
in 73 bCe, the slaves—or rather, some slaves, if in large numbers—made a body, 
instead of being dispersed in groups. let’s accept that the trace of the revolt-
event be the statement: ‘we, slaves, we want to return home [chez nous]’. is the 
subject form the operation by which the new ‘body’ of slaves (their army and its 
dependents) joins itself to the trace?…its materiality is the consequences drawn 
day after day from the evental trace, that is, from a principle indexed to the possible: 
‘we, slaves, we want to and can return home’ (59).
once you recognize this operation, you might begin to discern it everywhere in ba-
diou—if under a sequence of ever-varying names. in an essay on beckett that first ap-
peared in French in Conditions, and now appears in english in On Beckett, badiou pin-
points a serious shift in beckett’s work of the 960s. it is from this shift that badiou is 
able to draw the lesson that every generic procedure ‘weaves within its singular duration 
these four functions: wandering, immobility, the imperative, and the story’ (ob 32). For 
badiou, it is important not to reduce the shift in order to discern the return of return; 
to add to our list of pertinent features of the sequel, this raises the question of time. the 
sequel’s double-blow, its irreducible twoness, can’t help but make one think of various 
utterances of badiou’s, e.g. ‘time…is intervention itself, thought as the gap between two 
events’ (be 20) or ‘the structure of the ultra-one is the two’ (be 20); or, in low, draw-
ing on the ‘striking’ examples of spartacus and archimedes, ‘we will call this destination 
resurrection, which reactivates a subject in another logic of its appearing-in-truth’ (74). in 
any case, the return or resurrection must be a return to unprecedented possibilities in 
and of the present, founded on the contingency of an evaporated event and its uncanny 
trace.
in other words, it is not the bestselling success of be that founds the necessity for a 
sequel, but, beyond whatever its (perceived) errors, insufficiencies, and obscurities might 
be, there is a truth to continue across the interruption (i.e., a cleft of non-relation). as 
a sequel then, low announces itself as: a reiteration of certain ideas of be, notably the 
Being & Time 2? there is something unplanned about a philosophical sequel (or its failure to appear).
9. a. badiou, Le Siècle, paris, seuil, 2005, p. 2. i am indebted to alberto toscano for use of his excellent 
draft translation of this book, which i rely on here.
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proposition that ‘mathematics is ontology’; a revision of certain claims of be, notably the 
theory of the subject and event; a replacement of certain concepts, notably that of ‘situa-
tion’ by ‘world’; an extension of certain tendencies of be, notably the much fuller account 
given of logic; and a supplementation of certain minimal elements of be, notably in the 
descriptions of political and artistic processes. Yet there is a final aspect: low wishes 
also to complete be, to fill in its holes and answer its critics. this (inexpungible but ille-
gitimate) desire will, as we will see, have serious consequences for low’s structure. re-
iteration, revision, replacement, extension, supplementation, and completion: we find 
that badiou himself is obsessed with the problem of the sequel, which returns through-
out his post-be work under an extraordinary smattering of diverse names. it is in the 
scattered light of this embarkation-return and disciplinary-archiving (‘sequel’, ‘anabasis’, 
‘resurrection’)—which, on badiou’s own account, always produces a new body and new 
possibilities—we will examine what becomes of be in low. whatever else one can say, 
Hollywood cinema and philosophical sequels clearly do have something in common. 
For both, sequels are a common modality of the generic.
ii. pHilosopHY as Conditioned, Conditions as absolutes
what made reading Being and Event such a deranging experience was that its author 
had clearly touched upon an absolute.0 even if you end up disagreeing with every propo-
sition in that book, it is nonetheless impossible to read and not agree that contemporary 
philosophy will have to change in its wake—whether in the guise of affirmation, exten-
sion, critique, resistance, rejection, or some other operation. the asceticism of its pres-
entation, the assuredness of its declarations, the rigour of its structure, the inevitability 
of its development, the universality of its ambition, all help to render be an event in the 
thought of being. in this regard, badiou’s account in his ‘author’s preface’ to the recent 
english translation of be perhaps errs on the side of politesse:
soon it will have been twenty years since i published this book in France. at that 
moment i was quite aware of having written a ‘great’ book of philosophy. i felt that 
i had actually achieved what i had set out to do. not without pride, i thought that 
i had inscribed my name in the history of philosophy, and, in particular, in the 
history of those philosophical systems which are the subject of interpretations and 
commentaries throughout the centuries (xi).
what makes be such a ‘great’ book? among its major claims are the following:
plato is the founding moment of philosophy
plato founds philosophy insofar as he interrupts poetry’s revelation of pres-
ence by means of pure mathematics
this interruption also entails the rethinking of love and politics
plato therefore founds philosophy on extra-philosophical conditions
0. see Jon roffe’s review of Being and Event in this issue of Cosmos and History.
. although it is true that many of these claims are only fully rendered clear, explicit and distinct in ac-
companying texts such as Conditions and Manifesto for Philosophy, they are implicit in be.
•
•
•
•
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there are four, and only four, of these conditions
these conditions are irreducible to each other
these conditions are mathematics, poetry, love and politics
the conditions are truth procedures
the foundation of philosophy was an act that organized these conditions into 
a system
to do philosophy is to remain faithful to this founding act
remaining faithful to this foundation entails the construction of a system ac-
cording to the contemporary directions proposed by these conditions
these contemporary directions enjoin: attending to set theory, attending to 
poetry, attending to post-revolution emancipatory politics, attending to psy-
choanalysis qua love
this attention will result in ideas, such as ‘mathematics is ontology’, ‘poetry 
delivers the matheme of the event’, ‘politics engages the universality of ad-
dress’, ‘love is the struggle of the non-relation’.2
although it is necessary to be telegraphic in the present context, there are a number of 
details that must be clarified, above all, the concept of ‘condition’. 
the concept is best explained by recourse to badiou’s claims about mathematics. 
pure mathematics is the paradigm of deductive rationality. anyone can do mathemat-
ics, yet anyone who does mathematics will be constrained to the same results; or, more 
precisely, to the same points of undecidability. such mathematics has no empirical ref-
erence. mathematics clarifies the problems about which one can rationally speak, and 
how one must speak of them (i.e., to invoke ‘infinity’ today outside of its post-Cantorian 
acceptation is mere flatus vocis or obscurantism). its verification is immanent to its practice; 
indeed, verification and practice are inseparable in regard to mathematics. mathematics 
is therefore in this sense indubitable, obeying only its own procedures. anyone doing 
mathematics must accord with these procedures and their results. mathematics is there-
fore also egalitarian: all are literally equalized in their submission to its procedures. 
its conditioning by mathematics means philosophy has an unbreakable commit-
ment to the most rigorous possible form of rationality. this rationality is detached from 
any direct empirical influences whatsoever (i.e., not only from history, social mores, 
sexual, ethnic, religious differences, etc., but from the vicissitudes of natural languages 
themselves). moreover, the limits of mathematics are rigorously given within mathemat-
ics itself. these features have further consequences pertinent here. First, one cannot 
judge mathematics by any external criteria; only mathematics is adequate to its own 
reason. philosophy must follow the lead of mathematics, not the other way around. sec-
ond, philosophy must take reason as far as it can go; if one starts to follow mathematics, 
2. significantly, badiou insists that each generic procedure has an affect proper to it. in On Beckett, he 
writes: ‘Happiness also singularizes love as a truth procedure, for happiness can only exist in love. such is 
the reward proper to this type of truth. in art there is pleasure, in science joy, in politics enthusiasm, but in 
love there is happiness’, p. 33. He repeats this schema verbatim in low. see the excellent little tableau , 
p. 86 (reproduced below).
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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one must follow it to the bitter end. third, in doing so, philosophy must be prepared 
to rupture with all social prejudices, even and especially one’s own. Four, mathematics 
cannot, for all that, be permitted to totalize what happens; indeed, mathematics explic-
itly theorizes and prohibits its own totalization.
after all, what happens radically exceeds mathematics. How could one talk of a 
mathematics of love or politics or, indeed, poetry, when it is precisely their extra-de-
ductive character that is essential to these genres? For badiou, love, politics and art 
are also genres that have a genuinely thoughtful kernel—if the materials and opera-
tions by which they reason cannot be anticipated by deduction. as we shall see, these 
genre-conditions can (after the fact) be formalized by mathematical means by philosophy 
(e.g., in ‘mathemes’), but their apparition is due only to ungovernable Chance and their 
process of their development entirely subjective. moreover, each of these genres deals 
with a different aspect of human creativity: art with the problem of being emerging as 
absent presence; love as the problem of sustaining an encounter with a non-dialectizable 
‘other’; politics as the problem of non-totalizable universality.3 and mathematics has a 
particular claim on our philosophical attention. badiou notoriously declares that ‘math-
ematics is ontology’, a statement to which we will return in the next section of this re-
view. these genres are founded in ‘events’, that is, as non-deducible, illegal occurrences 
in a situation whose consequences may come to bear on the experiences of all. truths 
rupture History. For badiou, all the genres share the following features. they are: con-
tingent in their emergence, immanent to their situations, self-supporting in their elaboration, 
indifferent to all existing forms of self-interest, egalitarian in their address, restrained in their 
extension. it is this six-fold aspect that renders truths (or, more precisely, the event-sub-
ject-truth process) absolute. note how contingency and restraint (non-totalization) here 
become part of what it means to be absolute, a radically untraditional conception; note 
that self-supporting means ‘bearing its reason within itself ’ and ‘supported of/by a self 
[subject]’; note that indifference includes ‘excepting itself from pre-existing forms of 
temporality’, as time is usually practised as an exemplary form of self-interest; note that 
egalitarian is synonymous with ‘bearing universal address’, and so on.4
3. How badiou differentiates these conditions from text to text is of extreme interest. in The Century, he 
notes that ‘science…possesses problems; it does not have a project’, while in Conditions, he shows how love 
and politics begin at each other’s rear ends, so to speak. For badiou, if one condition comes to dominate 
one or another (or indeed all) of the others, this entails what he calls a ‘suture’: under such conditions, phi-
losophy itself disappears, and the conditions may start to take on the roles that are properly the province of 
philosophy (e.g., poetry in the post-romantic era starts to think being).
4. i believe these features are plausible, even compelling, as a description of the peculiarities of these four 
‘discourses’. empiricist and anecdotal as such a remark may be, i can verify that english political activists, 
italian historians and australian artists have also found this compelling as a description of their practices. 
it also strikes me that these features also constitute an immanent philosophical justification—or, to use the 
more bombastic term favoured in recent French thought, an ‘affirmation’—of these practices. philosophy 
must affirm the extra-philosophical thoughts that make it possible. Finally, this coupling of description 
and justification enables a third moment, an ‘explanatory’ one, e.g., ‘mathematics is ontology’. what such 
statements present is a purely philosophical seizure of the status of the particular discourse. description-
justification-explanation: if you will excuse such teminology, it is still possible to accept that this is one of the 
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philosophy is to construct a system on the basis of the four conditions, and on these 
four alone. why? as badiou reiterates in Logiques des mondes: 
the fact is that today—and on this point things have not shifted since plato—we 
know only four types of truths: science (mathematics and physics), love, politics 
and the arts. we can compare this situation to spinoza’s report concerning the 
attributes of substance (the ‘expressions’ of god): there are undoubtedly, spinoza 
says, an infinity of attributes, but we, men, know only two, thought and extension. 
perhaps there are, we will say, an infinity of types of truths, but we, men, know only 
four. However, we know them truly. in such a way that our relation to truths…is 
absolute (80).5 
i have italicized the word absolute in the final sentence above, because it is precisely the 
status of our relation to the conditions as absolute that i want to emphasize here. no 
other ‘human’ practices can provide such an absolute. this ‘absoluteness’ is, as i have 
been concerned to specify, of a very precise if peculiar kind. philosophy really must be 
conditioned by these absolutes. How badiou does this will become apparent to anyone 
who reads be carefully: he directly transliterates the operations of the conditions into 
philosophical jargon. there’s hardly more to it than that. the axioms of set theory pro-
vide all the necessities for the ontology; the operations of poetry provide the matrix for 
an extra-rational thought of the event qua undecidable (see, in particular, meditation 9 
on mallarmé). by means of such a transliteration, philosophy constructs its own ‘ideas’. 
these ideas are phrased in such terms as ‘mathematics is ontology’. this means that, as 
oliver Feltham puts it in his ‘translator’s preface’ to be, a philosophical idea is at once 
‘a decision, a principle and a hypothesis’ (xxii), one which could only have been gener-
ated out of some kind of confrontation with conditions. the absolute forces questioning, 
not any kind of belief. indeed, ‘condition’ should also be given the logical flavour of the 
conditional for its subjects: if this event, then what are the consequences?
so badiou’s absolute conditions are clearly not the Hegelian absolute. there is no 
whole; there is no single overarching logic of presentation, developmental or not; there 
is no necessity to a truth, nor essence of truths; there is no temporalization of the con-
cept, etc. in general, it cannot be philosophy’s task to try to think everything; indeed, for 
badiou, philosophy is necessarily a precarious discourse, for at least three reasons. the 
first of these, the ‘pragmatic reason’, is that, dependent as philosophy is on its conditions, 
not all these conditions are functional in all epochs and places: in such cases, philosophy 
itself must disappear. the second reason, the ‘bad reason’, is that philosophy, consist-
ently tempted to think outside the square, dissolves itself in the temptation to think the 
non-existent ‘whole’, either ossifying into overweening dogmatism or reducing itself to 
knots that philosophy should tie.
5. the paragraph begins ‘a truth is certainly an experience of the inhuman. However, “our’’ point of view 
that forges (in philosophy) the theory of truths and subjective figures has a price: we cannot know if the types 
of truths we experience are the only possible ones. other species, unknown to us, or even our own species, 
at another stage of its history (for example, transformed by genetic engineering), can, perhaps, accede to 
types of truths of which we have no idea, and even no image’, low, p. 80.
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just another way of describing the incoherent slew of empirical happenings (for exam-
ple as a glorified grammarian or sociologue, as a physicist manqué or psychologist). 
the third, ‘good reason’, is that, even when these conditions are all available, they are 
themselves exceptionally difficult to grasp; every ‘successful’ philosophy is therefore, at 
best, built on a constitutive instability. there is no totality to think, only the contingent 
becomings of heterogeneous event-truths and their subjects. philosophy tries to seize on 
the ideas these conditions induce, as axioms of and for action.6 this is the fundamen-
tally affirmative movement of philosophy. it is the ‘void place’ constructed by philosophy 
to enable the heterogeneous truths produced by its conditions to meet, that badiou 
refers to as ‘truth’. the difficulties of doing so entails that the absolute in philosophy is 
not something one can relax into, like a warm bath or a reliable security system, but, 
on the contrary, involves the savage wrenching-away of every certainty, the embrace of 
incalculable risk. worse still, this savagery of the absolute is quiet, fragile, almost indis-
cernible….
despite the brevity of this summary, it should be clear how badiou takes his distance 
from theology and analytic philosophy on the one hand; and the extreme affects of re-
ligious beliefs, on the other. one must not underestimate this aspect of badiou’s work, 
which, having pure reason as a paradigm, induces him to repudiate all forms of religious 
and theological thought. this does not mean that he does not engage with examples of 
such thought. on the contrary, he makes committed interventions into such thought, by 
essaying to detach what he de facto treats as the pure thought of such thinkers from the 
‘religious’ impurities in which they are inextricably enmired. in this approach, some-
body like saint paul becomes an exemplary political militant and thinker, who ought to 
be extracted from his religious envelope, including from the history of the church.7
this is why i sometimes characterize badiou’s philosophy as a ‘slap philosophy’: 
philosophy not only integrally relies on science, love, art and politics, but it gives you 
a slap to awaken you from the nightmare of history. moreover—and i apologize for the 
cheesy sloganizing here—one can usefully permute these letters as a handy mnemonic 
for badiou’s doctrines. the work of fidelity can be considered long, protracted, repeti-
tive, difficult: it’s like doing laps. but if one persists, one acquires pals in this enter-
prise, that is, philosophical friends with whom you also engage in questioning around 
the status of truths and truth. as such, you’ll attain the heights of thought in those 
philosophical alps presently ‘icy with forgetting and desuetude’ (and maybe get some 
skiing in while you’re there). slap → laps → pals → alps: the permutations of 
philosophy.8
i have begun with a protracted review of what may now appear, after many years of 
commentary, very familiar, even merely introductory, platitudes about badiou’s system. 
i do not, however, believe this to be the case. one of the difficulties that commentators 
6. see a. badiou, infinite Thought, ed. and trans. J. Clemens and o. Feltham, london, Continuum 2003, 
p. 54.
7. see a. badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of  universalism, trans. r. brassier, stanford, stanford up, 2003.
8. o, the fortuity if not fatuity of acronyms!
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have so far had is taking seriously the concept of ‘condition’. to the extent that they do 
so, they miss badiou’s utter reliance on his conditions. Cantorian set-theory really is 
ontology for badiou; mallarmé’s poetry really does provide the matheme of the event. 
these are not ‘examples’, no matter how subtly one thinks the problematic of the exam-
ple. they are absolutes. as such, they are the only possible foundations for a philosophi-
cal system.
iii. From matHematiCs to logiC; From situations to worlds; 
From being to being-tHere; From essenCe to appearanCe; 
From subJeCts to obJeCts; From Conditions to transCen-
dentals
as i have noted, many things remain the same between be and low. mathematics 
remains the science of being, and truths remain exceptions to existence. badiou puts it 
like this: ‘There are only bodies and languages, except there are truths’, as a kind of slogan of what 
he here denominates his ‘materialist dialectic’, to distinguish it from the common or gar-
den kind of ‘democratic materialism’ dominant today. the slogan’s syntax is explicitly 
mallarméan—the stars its destination—to demarcate it from the repulsive ‘modesties’ 
of philosophies of finitude. whereas democratic materialism believes that ‘there are 
only individuals and communities’, the materialist dialectic proclaims that truths are 
accompanied by the eclipsing of all individuation and community. truths are eternal, 
infinite, generic; they are supported by depersonalized, ‘inhuman’, subjects. as we have 
seen, part of the point of conditions is to think affirmatively, i.e., proceed on the basis of 
positive constructions alone. be’s procedure continues in low. as badiou says, ‘in no 
way do i go back on all this’ (45). 
what, then, has changed between be and low? as the title of this subsection 
announces, there are a number of key changes in the vocabulary, argumentation, or-
ganization and references. the aim for badiou is to reconfigure his existing concerns in 
a different framework, that is, according to ‘the singularity of worlds where [truths] ap-
pear’ (45). with this in mind, badiou elaborates a fuller account of subjective variation, 
a revised account of the event, a new account of appearance, a new concept of objectiv-
ity, an extended account of logic (by shifting from set theory to category theory), and so 
on.9 on his own account, however, the ‘most considerable stake of  LOW is to produce a new 
definition of  bodies, understood as truth-bodies, or subjectifiable bodies’ (44). to do this, however, 
badiou has to reformulate the status of logic itself. in this new dispensation, ‘“logic” 
9. ‘eilenberg and mac lane created categories in the 940s as a way of relating systems of algebraic struc-
tures and systems of topological spaces in algebraic topology. the spread of applications led to a general 
theory, and what had been a tool for handling structures became more and more a means of defining 
them. grothendieck and his students solved classical problems in geometry and number theory using new 
structures—including toposes—constructed from sets by categorical methods. in the 960s, lawvere began 
to give purely categorical definitions of new and old structures, and developed several styles of categorical 
foundations for mathematics’, C. mcClarty, Elementary Categories, Elementary Toposes, oxford, oxford univer-
sity press, 992, p. .
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and “consistency of appearing” are the same thing’ (47), and it is from this point that he 
returns to the problem of the subject.
For badiou, a subject is not a register of experience, a moral category, or an ideo-
logical fiction (‘three dominant determinations’ of the subject); on the contrary, it is 
an index of the real, born of an event, faithful to the trace. though a political subject 
is as different from a subject of love as that subject is from a subject of mathematics, 
etc., each subject must be formally thought according to the same concepts. in be, this 
subject is a ‘finite quantity of truth’. From the standpoint of be’s conception, then, indi-
viduals that didn’t assent or remained indifferent to the event were implicitly considered 
by badiou to remain mere state agents, agents of inertia. as such, they were not held 
to be, stricto sensu, subjects. in be, a political reactionary is not a subject; an academic 
painter is not part of a truth process; nor are the surgeons who sneered at lord lister’s 
absurd obsession with hygiene, and sharpened their scalpels on their boots; nor those 
who reduce love to a pure biological function or a category of euphemistic illusion. this 
is a central instance of the binary minimalism of be: if there is a subject, it must be af-
firmative; if it is not affirmative, it is not a subject. in low, however, to this basic model 
of the faithful subject, badiou has added two (or three) more categories: the reactionary, 
the obscure and the resurrected. spartacus’s slave revolt is his primary example in this 
initial delineation.
badiou has had to do this in order to explain how, in the responses to the emergence 
of a faithful subject, reactionaries too are perfectly capable of inventiveness (or, rather, 
are forced to be so). as he writes: ‘to resist the call of the new, it is again necessary to 
create arguments of resistance adjusted to the novelty itself. From this point of view, 
every reactive disposition is contemporary with the present against which it reacts’ (62). 
what’s typical of such a subject is that it works to extinguish the present that a faithful 
subject has opened, denying its possibilities and powers through ‘the negation of the 
evental trace’. don’t revolt, it’s not worth it, you’ll just end up getting yourself crucified 
on the appian way. or: all things in moderation, just slow down, we’ll set up some 
committees to look into gladiatorial affairs and maybe have a sausage-sizzle too. Here 
badiou invokes andré glucksmann and his cohort of nouveaux philosophes as contem-
porary imagos of such reactionary moderation.
but we also find an ‘obscure’ [obscur] subject: ‘what relation can a patrician of an-
cient rome have to the alarming news that assails him concerning the slave revolt? 
or a Vendean bishop learning of the downfall and imprisonment of the king?’ (67)20 
well, what they want is ‘the pure and simple conservation of the prior order’. the ob-
scure subject wants above all to repress the present, to repel the event in the name of a 
20. there is absolutely no question that badiou has drawn this term ‘obscur’ from what must be one of his 
favourite poems, mallarmé’s sonnet on edgar allan poe, in which we read of the ‘Calme bloc ici-bas chu 
d’un désastre obscur…’ badiou’s allusions to this verse occur in all sorts of contexts: his novel is entitled 
Calme bloc ici-bas, another little volume on politics is d’un désastre obscur, and so on and on. aside from the 
resonances of such allusions, one should undoubtedly hear in ‘obscur’, not only ‘unclear’, or ‘unknown’, but 
‘dark’ and ‘gloomy’, as well as ‘obscuring’ and ‘obscurantist’, etc.
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transcendent body (‘City, god, race’), and, to this extent, obliterate the event and its 
trace altogether. if the reactive subject wishes to snuff the extremity of the present, the 
obscure subject wishes thereafter to shovel it under.
so these three figures of the subject all respond to the present with different opera-
tions: ‘the faithful subject organizes its production, the reactive subject, its denial…and the 
obscure subject, its occultation’ (70). one can immediately see how and why the doctrines 
of be have been altered; this new attempt retains the method of double affirmation (phi-
losophy affirms the conditions because these conditions are already affirmative in the 
real), but aims to provide a fuller and more nuanced description of some subjective fea-
tures evident in reality. moreover, it suggests why no-one can ignore or remain merely 
indifferent to or undecided about events. to pick up on one of badiou’s own examples, 
today god really is dead, and it is this event (some might prefer to call it a ‘non-event’) 
that fundamentalists want to occlude at all costs. Yet they betray the patency of god’s 
death in their very attempts at occultation…. what’s still missing from this triple figure 
of the subject is a crucial possibility that i have already flagged: its resurrection. 
the problem is a very serious one for badiou: can a truth, once broached, ever be 
utterly destroyed? take the avatars of spartacus himself. they return in the slave revolt 
of the French revolution, in the ‘black spartacus’ who is toussaint-louverture; they 
return in Karl leibnecht and rosa luxemburg, the spartacists; they return in stanley 
Kubrick’s Spartacus, where all declaim ‘i am spartacus’; they also return, though badiou 
doesn’t mention it, in monty python’s Life of  Brian (‘i am brian, and so is my wife’). 
‘spartacus’ therefore returns in very different worlds, in very different circumstances. it 
is the logic of this resurrection that badiou is going to have to explicate, that is, how ‘the 
multiplicity of worlds’ can be articulated with ‘the invariance of truths’. resurrection is, 
as i will show, the key, the crucial, figure that governs the entirety of low—in line with 
the very essence of sequels.
For the moment, however, badiou is able to give only the etiolated lineaments of 
this figure. these lineaments are summarized at the end of book i in two (almost exces-
sively) helpful diagrams, one of which i reproduce here (from 86). 
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Truths Ontologi-
cal back-
ground (A)
Evental 
trace (ε)
Body () Present 
(local)
Affect Present 
(global) 
 (π)
Politics state and 
people (rep-
resentation 
and presen-
tation)
a < st (a)
Fixation of 
the super-
power of the 
state
ε⇒(st (a) 
=α)
organiza-
tion
new 
egalitarian 
maxim
enthusiasm sequence
Arts perceptible 
intensity and 
the calm of 
forms
p ↔ f
what was 
formless can 
be form
¬ f → f
oeuvre new percep-
tive intensity
pleasure Configura-
tion
Love sexuated 
disjunction
m ⊥ f
undeter-
mined 
object 
(encounter)
(∃u) [m ≤ u 
and f ≤ u]
Couple 
(bi-sexuated)
new existen-
tial intensity
Happiness enchant-
ment
Science border of 
the world 
grasped or 
not by the 
letter
 l (w) | ¬ l 
(w)
what 
rebelled 
against the 
letter is sub-
mitted to it
¬l (w) → 
l (w)
result 
(law, theory, 
principles…)
new  
knowledges
Joy theory
Table 1—The truth procedures and their singular activation21
the ‘scholium’ that immediately follows book i, titled ‘a musical variant of the 
metaphysics of the subject’, provides a very full and interesting example drawn from the 
development of serial music. this section, moreover, offers some excellent summariz-
ing propositions of badiou’s altered doctrine of the subject. whereas the restraint of be 
saw it speak very little of subjective affect—limiting itself at most to two, anxiety and 
courage22—low insists on a quadrature of affects, terror, anxiety, courage and jus-
2. note that i have tampered with badiou’s mathemes here. the French for the ‘ontological background’ 
of politics is, of course, a < et (a), that is, a < etat (a), thus becoming a < state (a) in english ; for the arts, 
‘le monde exhibe une forme singulière de la tension entre l’intensité du sensible et le calme de la forme’, p. 
8. i have here translated ‘sensible’ as ‘perceptible’, and hence ‘s ↔ f ’ becomes ‘p ↔ f ’. likewise, m for 
monde becomes w for world, and the ¢ for corps has become  for body. i am as yet uncertain of the value of 
such a transliteration. in lacan’s case, his mathemes were intended to be ‘integrally transmissible’, that is, 
without any translation, e.g., ‘a’ for ‘autre’ should remain so in english (and not become ‘o’ for ‘other’, etc.).
22. note that the question of affects arises in be particularly around the question of the status of poetry, and 
of the matheme of the undecidable that mallarmé provides: ‘given that undecidability is a rational attribute 
of the event, and the salvatory guarantee of its non-being, there is no other vigilance than that of becoming, 
as much through the anxiety of hesitation as through the courage of that outside-place, both the feather, which 
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tice.23 note that all of these affects are now considered internal and essential moments 
of any truth-process, whereas each truth-process has also its characteristic or signature 
affect. as the table above shows, politics is linked to enthusiasm, the arts to pleasure, 
love to happiness, and science to joy. telegraphic as these assignations could appear, it 
is equally true that they find strong support within the philosophical tradition itself (e.g., 
think of spinoza’s joy, which is very closely linked to the practice of science; or of the 
pleasure Kant assigns to the arts, etc.).
but it is really in books ii, iii and iV that the full project of low gets going. this 
is ‘la grande logique’, which aims to provide a general theory of the logic of appear-
ing, of objects and their relations, subsuming under its gargantuan umbrella the ‘little 
logic’ that is the grammatical and linguistic analysis beloved of analytic philosophy (03). 
in order to do so, badiou has recourse—as i have already flagged above—to category 
theory. if badiou’s deployment of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory governed the entire con-
ceptual presentation of be, here the presentation is governed by the necessities of the 
algebraic proofs. both set theory and category theory are often considered to be rival 
‘foundations of mathematics’. as saunders mac lane, one of the doyens of category 
theory, has remarked, the former axiomatizes sets and their elements, whereas the latter 
axiomatizes functions, that is, relations—and not elements at all. For his part, badiou 
will continue to affirm that set theory is ontology, but that category theory founds the 
logic of appearing.24
book ii concentrates on the construction of the concept of the ‘transcendental’. this 
constitutes quite a severe departure from the situations of be. in be, being [l’être] was 
‘‘hovers about the gulf ’,’ and the star “up high perhaps’,’’ be, p. 98, my emphasis. it is further noteworthy 
that affects are identified with the subjects of truths, not with philosophy or philosophers; in fact, i cannot 
think of any place where badiou discusses an affect proper to philosophy as such.
23. ‘Four affects signal the incorporation of a human animal to the subjective process of a truth. the first 
is evidence of the desire for a great point, of a decisive discontinuity, that will install the new world with a 
single blow, and complete the subject. we will name it terror. the second is evidence of the fear of points, 
of a retreat before the obscurity of all that is discontinuous, of all that imposes a choice without guarantee 
between two hypotheses. or, again, this affect signals the desire for a continuity, for a monotone shelter. we 
will name it anxiety. the third affirms the acceptance of the plurality of points, that the discontinuities are at 
once imperious and multiform. we will name it courage. the fourth affirms the desire that the subject be a 
constant intrication of points and openings. it affirms the equivalence, in regard to the pre-eminence of the 
becoming-subject, of what is continuous and negotiated, and of what is discontinuous and violent. it is only 
there that there are subjective modalities, which depend on the construction of the subject in a world and 
the capacities of the body to produce effects. they are not to be hierarchized. war can be as good as peace, 
negotiation as good as struggle, violence as good as gentleness. this affect by which the categories of the act 
are subordinated to the contingency of worlds, we will name justice’, low, pp. 96-7.
24. ‘in category theory, the initial data are particularly meager. we merely dispose of undifferentiated ob-
jects (in fact, simple letters deprived of any interiority) and of ‘arrows’ (or morphisms) ‘going’ from one ob-
ject to another…the aim is ultimately for the ‘obejcts’ to become mathematical structures and the ‘arrows’ 
the connection between these structures. but the purely logical initial grasping renders the determination of 
an object’s sense entirely extrinsic or positional. it all depends on what we can learn from the arrows going 
toward that object (whose object is the target), or of those coming from it (whose object is the source). an 
object is but the marking of a network of actions, a cluster of connections. relation precedes being’, to, 
p. 45.
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thought in its raw multiplicity; here, being is thought in its organized localization, as 
‘being-there’ [l’être-là] in a ‘world’. every world must have a transcendental organiza-
tion, around which multiples cohere according to their differing degrees of identity or 
difference. it is a classical problem—‘how to conjoin, in the substance of the soul of the 
world, the same and the other?’—and immediately demands a theory of negation or 
rather, for badiou, of the reverse [envers].25 badiou gives the reverse ‘three fundamental 
properties’:
the reverse of a being-there (or, more precisely, of the measure of apparition 
[apparition] of a multiple in a world) is in general a being-there in the same 
world (a different measure of intensity of apparition in that world).
of both the reverse and negation it can be said that a being-there and its 
reverse have nothing in the world in common (the conjunction of their degrees 
of intensity is null).
in general, the reverse doesn’t have all the properties of classical negation. in 
particular, the reverse of the reverse of a degree of apparition is not inevitably 
identical to this degree. and again, the union of an appearing [apparaissant] 
and its reverse is not inevitably equal to the measure of apparition of the world 
in its entirety (7-8).
badiou immediately proceeds to show that: there is no whole (using an argument 
directly derived from russell’s critique of Frege); that an existent can only be thought 
insofar as it belongs to a world; that, nonetheless, there has to be some kind of minimum 
available, which doesn’t appear in a world (‘a sort of zero’); there are maximal and mini-
mum degrees of apparition, and so on. He gives an excellent account of Hegel, a formal 
account of what he calls the ‘three transcendental operations’ (zero, conjunction and the 
envelope) of appearing, as well as a brilliant demonstration of the superiority of badiou’s 
own ‘grand logic’ over ‘ordinary logic’. this section is a kind of compressed tour de 
force, in which the familiar operations of ordinary logic (and/or/implication/negation, 
the quantifiers) are derived from badiou’s new categories of minimum, maximum, con-
junction and envelope. the book concludes with a notice: ‘what is a classical world?’ 
there we find that such a world has double negation and excluded middle as valid 
principles, that ‘a classical world is a world whose transcendental is Boolean’ (200), and that—as 
badiou has said elsewhere—ontology is such a classical world.26 note the new, subtle 
and formal justification of set theory as an ontology: a logic is now explicitly given to this 
25. i am translating envers here as ‘reverse’ in accordance with the existing translation in Theoretical Writings, 
e.g. pp. 23-29. it is possible that one should see some relation to the mathematics of the ‘inverse’, but the 
word for this in French is, precisly, ‘inverse’.
26. in the ‘renseignements’ at the back of low, badiou notes: ‘it finally appears that the two great aristotelian 
principles (non-contradiction and excluded middle), such as are proposed in Metaphysics Γ, condition three 
logical types (and not two, as has been long believed). one can in fact validate universally the two principles 
(classical logic), or only the principle of non-contradiction (intuitionist logic), or only excluded middle (para-
consistent logics)’, p. 557. badiou immediately continues : ‘the canonical model of classical logic is set theory, 
that of intuitionist logic, topoi theory, that of para-consistent logics, category theory. these models are more 
and more general, and negation becomes more and more evasive’, pp. 557-558.
.
2.
3.
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decision, whereas in deleuze, it was still being put down to a question of ‘taste’.27
book iii ‘proposes an entirely new concept of what an object is’ (205). the novelty 
of this concept derives from the fact that badiou thereby ‘constructs an object without 
subject’, that is, that the logic of appearing must be purely objective. this will be done 
through the concept of indexation: ‘if x and y are two elements of an existent a, and t is 
the transcendental of the world under consideration, indexation is an identity function 
Id (x, y) that measures in t the degree of ‘appearing’ of x and y. otherwise put, if Id 
(x, y) = p, this means that x and y are ‘identical to degree p’ in regard to their power 
of apparition in the world’ (206). Having established the atoms of appearance, the very 
minimum necessary to appear in a world at all, badiou seeks to explore this ‘articulation 
between the logic of appearing and the ontology of the multiple’ (208). in be, badiou 
shows that the ‘one’ does not exist, being only the self-dissimulating result of an opera-
tion of counting; in low, the one is rethought as the atom of appearing, as ‘the quilting 
point of appearing in being’ (23). appearing is always localized, it is always being-there, 
and being-there is inherently bound. if love comes in spurts (as richard Hell and the 
Voidoids put it), then existence comes in degrees. 
nonetheless, these degrees of existence are founded on something absolutely real: 
‘in a general fashion, an atom is a certain regulated rapport between an element a of 
a multiple a and the transcendental of a world….the postulate of materialism is that 
every atom is real’ (236). (with the proviso, of course, that existence is not a category of be-
ing.) this ‘real synthesis’ is the key to this book. whereas Kant cannot effectively suture 
the phenomenal to the noumenal, except at the cost of complex sophistries or causal 
leaps, badiou will insist that a real atom ‘attests to an apparition, in appearing, of the 
being of appearing’ (23). if this synthesis does not work, then being and appearance 
cannot be sewn together by badiou. (this will evidently be one of the key places for 
commentators to intervene in future essays into the worlds of low.) as for the object, it 
receives its definition at the same time:
given a world, we call an object of  the world the couple formed by a multiple and a transcendental 
indexation of  this multiple, on the condition that all the atoms of  appearing whose referential is 
the considered multiple are real atoms of  the referential multiple (233).
the object, in other words, is what bridges ‘being’ and ‘existence’. even quoting such 
definitions, which can only hint, in their very difficulty, at the logical sequences that un-
derpin them, it is impossible to convey the enchained rigour of book iii in any adequate 
way. it provides some of the most difficult formal passages i have read in contemporary 
european philosophy (i refer interested readers to 30 if they wish to marvel at the 
incredible little box ‘Complete form of the onto-logy of worlds’). such passages are leav-
ened only by detailed evocations of a political rally at the place de la république and of 
the aforementioned robert painting that graces the cover. despite the difficulties, you 
27. ‘as deleuze would have said, in immediately taking up again, just as i would myself, the thread of the 
argument and the desire to seduce or to win the other over: it is a question of taste’, a. badiou, deleuze: The 
Clamor of  Being, trans. l. burchill, minneapolis, university of minnesota press, 999, p. 92.
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can’t help but get the drift: ‘existence is at once a logical and an intensive concept’ (285). 
there are a number of other noteworthy moments, such as the demonstration that 
phenomenology and vitalism share a non-philosophical enthusiasm for death, an en-
thusiasm which exposes their weaknesses: ‘just like existence, death is not a category of 
being’ (285). no, death is a category of appearing (we will return to some consequences 
of this below). and the book concludes with the aptly-titled ‘scholium as impressive as 
it is subtle’, in which badiou gives a stunning example, a ‘logical evaluation’ of a battle 
between alexander the great and the persian emperor darius….
book iV concludes the ‘grand logic’ part of low, with a new thought of ‘relation’. 
relation must depend on objects, and not at all the other way around; this is why the 
grand logic moves from object to relation, and why there is a purely logical order at 
work in low. to allude to a statement of deleuze, no relation here is prior to or exter-
nal to its terms:
a relation is a bond between objective multiplicities—a function—that creates 
nothing in the order of intensities of existence or in the order of atomic localizations 
that was not already prescribed by the regime of apparition of those multiplicities 
(37).28
For badiou, the very ‘infinity of a world (ontological characteristic) entails the universal-
ity of relations (logical characteristic)’ (38), and that this universality be a consequence 
and not a postulate. this book’s major examples are drawn from the world of Quebec, 
its objects, politics and their relations. but the point is, again, fundamentally technical. 
For badiou, every world must be considered infinite, but its infinity is ‘inaccessible’, that 
is, according to the textbook formulation, if the following three conditions hold:
i. α > ℵ0; 
ii. for any cardinal β < α, there is 2β < α;
iii. the union of less than α ordinals, each less than α, is less than α.
as badiou notes, this definition operates a kind of ‘finitization’ of the infinite itself: ℵ0 
(aleph-zero) is the smallest infinite cardinal, ‘marking the caesura between finite and 
infinite’, and, as such, cannot be approached by operations on any natural number; an 
inaccessible cardinal larger than ℵ0 would therefore be really pretty big….nor is it any 
surprise that the existence of such a cardinal cannot be proven. the inaccessible infinity 
of a world is absolutely inaccessible from within the world itself, and ‘any “world” that 
pretended to less would not be a world’ (353). second, ‘this impossibility is what ensures 
that a world is closed, without for all that…being representable as a whole’ (326). now, 
this ontological closure also ensures logical completeness; it is also the case that any rela-
tion in the world must be universally exposed, objectively available. 
it is with book V ‘the four forms of change’ that the demonstration returns to badi-
28. For ‘the non-being of existence means that it is otherwise than according to its being that being is. it is, 
precisely, the being of an object. the object exhausts the dialectic of being and existence, which is also that 
of being and appearing or being-there, or finally that of extensive or mathematical multiplicity and intensive 
or logical multiplicity’, low, p. 36. note that ‘relation’ is here given a particular sense by badiou, that may 
signal a gap between the mathematical and philosophical notions of ‘relation’.
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ou’s more familiar terminology (multiples, sets, sites, events, etc.). but it is a reconfigured 
account of the site and event that we are given here. For badiou,
the ontology of a site thus allows itself to be described by three properties:
a site is a reflexive multiplicity, that belongs to itself and thereby transgresses 
the laws of being.
a site is the instantaneous revelation of the void that haunts multiplicities, by 
its transient cancellation of the gap between being and being-there.
a site is an ontological figure of the instant: it appears only to disappear (389).
be organized an entirely different disposition of the site/event couple: the site, not be-
ing a proper subset of the situation (or world), was ‘the minimal effect of structure which 
can be conceived’ (be 73) and provided the condition of being for the event; the event 
was considered a vanishing apparition composed simultaneously of elements from the 
site and itself. now, we have something like certain predicates of the site merged into 
certain predicates of the event, and a new hierarchy of possible changes. once again, 
against the minimality of be (event v. no event; change v. no change), we have a larger 
array of possibilities:
a modification is the basic form of change as usual, without requiring a site or 
any transcendental modification of the world;
 ‘a fact is a site whose intensity of existence isn’t maximal’;
 ‘a singularity is a site whose intensity of existence is maximal’ (393).
this is further complicated by a division within singularity. there we find ‘weak’ singu-
larities (without maximal consequences) or what is now denominated the ‘event’ proper 
(a singularity with maximal consequences for the world). in short: at the level of becoming, 
we can have no real change (modification) or real change (site); at the level of existence, 
we can have a non-maximal existence (a fact) or a maximal existence (a singularity); at 
the level of consequence, we have a weak singularity or an event (see diagram on 395; or 
more technical extension on 47).29
the key concept in the case of the event proper turns out to be what badiou calls 
‘the inexistent’. inexistence is a concept which comes up rather quickly in low, in 
ii.., to do with the ‘inexistence of the whole’ (9-2) and in ii..3, where the subtitle 
says it all: ‘inexistence of the whole: to affirm the existence of a set of all sets is intrinsi-
cally contradictory’ (65-67). but ‘the inexistent’ of an object is first properly dealt with 
in a conceptual and formal manner in iV..6 (338-34), then again in iV.3.4 (360-362). 
its first formulation is as follows: ‘we will call “the proper inexistent of  an object” an element of  
the sub-jacent multiples whose existence value is minimal’ (339). badiou continues: 
given an object in a world, there exists a unique element of this object that inexists 
29. ‘the four forms of change are formally defined on the basis of three criteria: inexistence or not of a site, 
force or weakness of singularity, the pickup [relève] or non-pickup of the inexistent. an ontological criterion, 
an existential criterion, and a criterion relative to consequences’, p. 46.
.
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in this world. it is this element that we call the proper inexistent of the object. it 
proves, in the sphere of appearance, the contingency of being-there. in this sense, 
its (ontological) being has (logical) non-being as being-there (34).
the ‘inexistent’ is thus a dissimulating avatar in low of be’s ‘void’ (or empty set); or, at 
least, it is a distant relative. so it is no surprise that, just as in be, an ‘event’ is integrally 
linked to the reemergence of the void that has been foreclosed from the situation or, in 
this new conceptual framework, to the uprising of the inexistent: ‘An event has for maxi-
mally true consequence of  its (maximal) intensity of  existence, the existent of  the inexistent’ (398).30 
this returns us to a pre-be doctrine, efficiently summarized by a Heiner müller phrase: 
‘for something to come, something has to go’. death—which had in be been purged 
altogether from the regime of being—is back on the agenda in low at the level of ap-
pearing and, of course, disappearing. as badiou puts it here, ‘the opening of a space for 
creation requires destruction’ (48).
this primes us for the final two books of low, book Vi, ‘the theory of points’, 
and book Vii, ‘what is a body?’ these books return us, in a different vocabulary, to 
some key moments in be. the ‘point’ is now how badiou rethinks the production of 
a truth from the point of view of the subject: ‘a faithful subject is the form of a body 
whose organs treat a worldly situation “point by point”’ (42). whereas in be the notion 
of forcing, of inquiries on the generic set, was employed to give a well-founded rational 
account of the process of a truth, in low this is given through the treatment of points. 
a ‘point’ is something that confronts the subject with a binary choice. there are only 
two possibilities on which to decide, and one cannot not decide (contrast this with be 
on the doctrine of the intervention on the event, e.g., the meditation on pascal, be 22-
222). to choose one is to continue in the truth; to choose the other is to abandon the 
truth, if not to decide for disaster: ‘there is a “point” when, through an operation that 
implies a subject and a body, the totality of the world is the stake of a coin-toss’ (422). 
Hence a decision upon which the world depends, the ‘reduction to the two of infinite 
multiplicity’ (423). the examples are, as elsewhere in low, rather diverse: key decisions 
in sartre’s plays, the city of brasilia, Kierkegaard, among others. For badiou, a subject 
treats points in a world, point by point, and must, as the advertizing campaign for a 
popular battery has it, ‘keep on keeping on’, despite all the difficulties. badiou has never 
resiled from martial examples: ‘a battle…can be abstractly defined as a point of war’ 
(43-2). life, as the emperor marcus aurelius put it in his diaries, is war; a war, badiou 
might add, of immortals. You can’t drop a point, as if it were neither here nor there. it’s 
immortality or nothing. 
so the ‘body’ in which badiou is interested in giving the concept of is a very peculiar 
body, a purified, new, immortal body of truth: ‘point by point, a body reorganizes itself, 
making more and more singular consequences appear in the world, which subjectively 
weave a truth of which one could say that it eternalizes the present of the present’ (525). 
30. Formally: ‘given an object (A, Id), we call event the apparition/disappearance of  the site A from the moment that this 
site is a singularity, whether EA=M, which really affects the proper inexistent of  the object, or (EA ⇒E∅a)=M’, low, 
p. 46.
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i would like to underline here the term ‘reorganize’, as it has connotations important 
to badiou: of novelty (it is a new body that is being produced); of metamorphosis (the 
novelty is real); of discipline (it is an organization, not simply a disorganization that is at 
stake). in line with his injunctions that a truth-body can therefore be neither individual 
nor communitarian, we could pun that ‘nobody, newbody’. it’s a materialist resurrec-
tion. but la vita nuova isn’t always la dolce vita. You have to struggle for it. and since we’re 
on this renaissance line of allusion, let’s continue down the line. Alea rejacta est: having 
crossed the rubicon of mathematics once, badiou has had to cast the dice of be again 
in order to head for the Capitol of logic, object and relation. 
iV. be→low
why, then, given its incredible range, clarity and import, can low feel unsatisfac-
tory? there is a clue in one of badiou’s own admissions. in V.3., under the heading 
‘Variations in the status of formal expositions’, he notes that the grand logic adum-
brated in books ii, iii and iV derives directly from category theory, and that ‘all this 
permitted the doubling of the conceptual exposition by a formal exposition supported 
by its concepts, and homogeneous with certain strata of deductive mathematics’ (4). 
Yet ‘it wasn’t so in book i, where the formalizations of the concept of the subject were, 
if one can say so, sui generis’. then, he continues, ‘in the present book, as in books Vi 
and Vii, we have a situation intermediary between book i (stripped of para-mathemati-
cal apparatus) and the three books of the grand logic (homogenous with entire strata 
of this apparatus)’ (4-42). this third variation constitutes a formal exposition that, 
although not deductive, seeks to flay, by means of its sharply ‘uninterpretable’ literality, 
the flesh of sense in order to expose the bones of truth.
it’s clear that badiou knows what he’s doing. but that’s just it: his self-knowledge 
forces him to present this triple variation, and it is this variation that frustrates and pro-
vokes throughout. badiou knows it too: one finds such apologia scattered throughout 
low. in the ‘technical note’ that concludes the preface, badiou writes: ‘From book ii, 
each movement of thought is presented in two different ways: conceptual (which means 
without any formalism, and with, each time, examples) and formal (with symbols, and 
if necessary, schemas and calculations). objective phenomenology and written transpa-
cency’ (50).3 i do not believe this gap is so easily presented as a benefit; indeed, it is quite 
not for badiou himself, given the symptomatic proliferation of apologia.32 
in be, as i have said, we have the most rigorous minimalism. be asks, in the most 
direct and rational fashion possible: what is the minimal situation of being, what are its 
3. For example, ‘the systematic meditations of be are followed here by an interlacing of examples and 
calculations that directly stage the consistent complexity of worlds. the latter, in fact, infinitely diversified 
figures of being-there, absorb in a transcendental frame, whose operations are invariant, the infinite nu-
ances of qualititative intensities’ low, pp. 47-8.
32. Yet another example: in the introduction to book iii, badiou notes, ‘it’s clear that, by reason of the 
extreme rigour of enchainments, the formal exposition is here often more illuminating than the phenom-
enological didactics that precede it’’, p. 209.
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elements, and what are the operations that can be performed upon them? this makes 
be a foundational work, in the triple sense that: it takes foundations as its object (being 
qua the void, the two, the undecidable, infinity, etc.); that it does this in a foundational 
way (according to mathematical reason, supplemented by poetic reason); and it thereby 
itself becomes foundational (an act of philosophical foundation). by contrast, low no 
longer treats of foundational ontology, but of transmundane variations of localization; 
it is no longer simply foundational, but aims to be more fully descriptive of what tran-
spires: ‘one can only fully account for these nuances of appearing through the media-
tion of examples drawn from varied worlds, and for the invariance of transcendental 
operations through the confrontation between the coherence of these examples and the 
transparency of forms’ (47-48). Yet the persuasiveness of descriptions varies radically in 
this book: the early account of the painted horses is miserably deficient compared to that 
of Hubert robert’s painting in book iii.
this isn’t a failure of style, far from it. on the contrary, badiou is a master of the 
pedagogical announcement, the clarified definition, the ordered progression, the direc-
tive heading, the illuminating instance and the recapitulative slogan. i am constantly 
struck by the demonstrative rigour of what may initially seem to be only loose discursive 
gestures, but which turn out to be highly structured and carefully-placed. the examples 
given in low’s preface are, for example, clearly preliminary, intended only to give 
intimations of claims that will be justified later. they thus provide a general rhetorical 
orientation. they cannot be taken as serious fodder for refutation, precisely because 
they serve such a clearly pedagogical function; moreover, their very variety is directed 
towards exposing the hard formal kernel that stabilizes their profusion.
still, badiou’s demonstrations in be were so clear and precise, so concerned to en-
sure the reader’s understanding of extremely difficult formal materials (just as descartes 
taught his manservant mathematics and wrote in the vernacular so even women might 
understand), that they never felt excessive or overwhelming. this is not always the case 
in low, where an enormous amount of formalism is deployed—with a much higher 
symbol-to-page ratio than in be—but not always with the same clarity, nor to the same 
effect. one can see the unavoidability of this state of affairs. after all, in the light of 
low, be is focussed on the elaboration of one world alone, the classical world of ontol-
ogy, in which non-contradiction and excluded middle reign supreme over their binary 
empire like Ferdinand and isabella over an expansionist spain. but low is concerned 
to speak of worlds, of the heterogeneity of worlds (classical, intuitionist and para-consist-
ent), and this entails much broader logical developments. the algebra is uncircumvent-
able, and, if one cannot follow it, one cannot seriously intervene in the descriptions.
For a number of reasons, category theory is more difficult than set theory. First, 
there is simply the time-lag: set theory essentially dates from the end of the 9th century; 
category theory arises post-wwii. this temporal fact means that we’ve all just had 
more time to deal with the impact of set theory and its infinite infinities. but there’s more 
to it than that. Category theory is, undoubtedly part of our transition to ‘post-moder-
nity’ (whatever that means); it is not the accomplice of mallarmé, lenin and Freud, but 
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accompanies Celan, mao and lacan. there is a certain difficulty, intensity and obscu-
rity to this new world. moreover, much of the philosophy of the 20th century has been 
directly inspired by and engaged with set theory in one way or another, from bertrand 
russell through ludwig wittgenstein to michael dummett. to do philosophy today is 
already to have encountered, even if indirectly, a set theory that has integrally shaped 
and been shaped by philosophy. this has not yet been the case for category theory, at 
least not in such a thoroughgoing and foundational way. Finally, as badiou himself has 
remarked, a crucial difference between mathematics and logic emerges here. set theory 
is essential mathematics: one can, at a pinch, understand the mathematical concepts, 
without having to follow the formal calculations (e.g., the innumerable accounts of rus-
sell’s paradox endemic to first-year philosophy courses). this doesn’t mean one doesn’t 
have to do the maths. Category theory, on the other hand, bears the essential hallmarks 
of formal logic (albeit mathematized): as the very name suggests, one cannot quite get 
it unless one submits to and goes through the formal definitions and procedures step by 
step.33 as badiou says, ‘logic is definitional, whereas real mathematics is axiomatic’ (to 
9). 
rather, the problem is not so much a problem of style as of substance. that is, any-
one who wishes to read low properly is going to have to follow the logic. one hopes—
without any real faith—that this fact will prevent commentators from trying to dismiss 
badiou’s use of logic and mathematics as if these were simply rhetorical add-ons, merely 
smart-arse ways of presenting a message that could just as well have been presented in 
common language without the use of all those symbols. to date, such a position remains 
the most obscurantist response to badiou’s work. one can regularly read critics (both 
‘for’ and ‘against’ badiou) who seem to think, if they do not declare it directly: ‘oh, the 
mathematics isn’t really important, we can go straight to the doctrines and treat them as 
if they were like any other philosophical utterances’.34 one can at least see why people 
are tempted to defend such a deleterious error, given they have been lucky enough to 
understand something thanks to the outstanding clarity of badiou’s conceptual re-pres-
entations. though it might be going too far to say something like ‘you don’t have to be a 
poet, mathematician, militant or lover to understand something about the thoughts they 
think, but you can’t really get anything about the logic unless you submit to the algebra’, 
33. badiou specifies: ‘the mathematics of being as such consists in forcing a consistency, in such a way that 
inconsistency is exposed to thought. the mathematics of appearing consists in disclosing, beneath the quali-
tative disorder of worlds, the logic that holds differences of existence and intensities together. this time, it 
is a question of exposing consistency. the result is a style of formalization at once more geometrical and 
more calculative, taken to the edge of a topology of localizations and an algebra of forms of order. whereas 
ontological formalization is more conceptual and axiomatic: it examines and unfolds decisions of thought 
of a very general import’, low, p. 48.
34. if you will forgive the execrable taste involved in self-citation, please refer on this point to my ‘doubles of 
nothing: the problem of binding truth to being in the work of alain badiou’, Filozofski vestnik, vol. XXVi, 
no. 2, 2005, pp. 97-. For a stringent critique of badiou’s mathematics—one of the very few that i have 
seen that goes about such a critique in an acceptable way, see r. grigg, ‘lacan and badiou: logic of the 
Pas-Tout’, in the same edition, pp. 53-65.
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it’s still tempting to do so—on the basis of the experience of reading low.
this is a consequence of badiou’s unrelenting pedagogical efforts. From maxims to 
tables, from exegesis to argument, badiou could not present his philosophy more clearly 
or rigorously. in low, he introduces each book with a summary of what is to come; he 
speaks of his method and its justification in ordinary language; he elucidates the techni-
cal elements of logic with an extraordinary care, and so on. His inclusion of scattered 
scholia and appendices, of a list of the book’s 66 major statements, of a ‘dictionary of 
concepts’, of an index, is testimony to his desire not to obscure anything. the ‘rensei-
gnements’ are of real interest, supplying unfailingly accessible yet incisive remarks about 
badiou’s references and trajectory, his antecedents and colleagues, his friends and his 
enemies (including a note on a genuinely hilarious compact with slavoj Žižek, as well 
as allusions to two stunning formal interventions by guillaume destivère). Yet a certain 
obscurity still emerges in the gap between demonstration and conviction, between de-
duction and rhetoric, in the very variability of the presentation. it is precisely because 
badiou must have recourse here to so many examples that his propos seems to waver. 
the radically inventive nature of low, which effects an almost violent technical resig-
nification of a wide range of terms (logic, appearing, transcendental, object, relation, 
envelope, reverse, maximal, etc.), is strained by the very tirelessness with which badiou 
surrounds the formal expositions with intuitive sketches. Yet, as badiou repeats through-
out, the descriptions are nothing without the logic and mathematics; it is the logic that 
must bring out the consistency binding the incoherent slew of appearances.
to put this another way, the problem is that the transliteral operations of be, which 
sutured set-theoretical mathematics and meta-ontological propositions without media-
tion, are shown to be highly localized operations, good for one particular classical world 
but not, by definition, necessarily for any other kind. in the very attempt to specify a 
theory of appearing that is consistent with the theory of being in be, badiou needs 
to find new operators between philosophy and logic that will ensure the gap between 
them is not, once again, subjected to the ruses of mediation. this necessity provokes 
certain questions that i am not sure have yet been adequately answered by badiou. to 
give some very simple examples: is the revised theory of the event-site given in low a 
more ‘general’ theory, one which leaves the account given in be correct, but only for 
the (‘special’, ‘restricted’) ontological situation? or is low correcting the theory of be 
tout court? or is low simply giving the theory of how event-sites function in appearing, 
saying nothing about how they function in being? this is, of course, the return of the 
problem of the sequel; or, for reasons i will shortly expand upon, of resurrection.
V. Kant or Hegel?
as Friedrich nietzsche pointed out, not the least charm of certain theories is that 
they can be refuted; everyone believes him- or herself strong enough for the job. so 
mediocrity survives, slipping unrepentantly from era to era like rameau’s nephew in 
search of a few small positions and a couple of coins. Certainly, many works sometimes 
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survive, not because of their refutability, but because of their irrefutability. and yet is it 
not always irrefutability that forces opponents to discover or invent entirely new ways 
to circumvent great philosophical interventions. it is something indifferent to the dis-
tinction ‘refutable’ and ‘irrefutable’. thus Kant’s division between noumenal and phe-
nomenal realms, his circumscription of the heterogeneous operations of thought, his 
elaboration of networks of categories and conditions to articulate this heterogeneity, 
etc., forced Fichte, Hegel and schelling to unprecedented efforts in philosophy. if one 
can certainly argue with Kant on his own grounds, his establishment of these grounds 
completely reconfigures the previous terms of philosophical discussion in such a way 
that hitherto central problems come to look like false problems or, even when on the 
right track, are superseded by the Kantian presentation. even then, if one later ‘out-
Kants’ Kant himself, he has, as i have said, forced such an operation, and has done so 
in such a way as to ensure what we might call the impossibility of his own obsolescence. 
He may be out of date. He may be wrong. His ontology may have been superseded by 
independent developments. Yet he cannot be circumvented. we are back to the problem 
of the absolute.
of all the philosophers (and anti-philosophers) to whom badiou dedicates little sec-
tions of low—including deleuze, Kierkegaard, lacan and leibniz—the two most 
important are undoubtedly Kant and Hegel (it is illuminating to refer to the index to 
see who gets the most references). as we know, this is not an idle coupling. if badiou 
certainly tries to treat them independently in his discussions, this is not altogether pos-
sible. Kant and Hegel have effectively set the terms of post-romantic philosophy to the 
present. the problem in this context is precisely the problem of the logics of worlds: 
does badiou offer a way in low to circumvent the stringent division inflicted on being 
by Kant, without simply sewing it up again, à la Hegel? let’s examine this question by 
a kind of indirect comparison.
First, Kant. if badiou dedicates an entire section of this book to an interpretation of 
Kant (iii.2), he notes in his ‘renseignements’ that ‘Kant is exemplarily the author with 
whom i have not managed to become familiar. everything about him irritates me, and 
first of all the legalism—always asking quid juris? or ‘Haven’t you crossed the limit?’—
combined, as in the united states today, with a religiosity all the more disturbing for 
being at once omnipresent and vague’ (56). For badiou, then, just as for deleuze (not to 
mention nietzsche), Kant is a rather unprepossessing figure. Yet badiou will also accord 
Kant a ‘shadowy grandeur’ and, following lacan, a ‘philosophical sadism’. 
this ambivalence shouldn’t hide the fact that Kant is perhaps the real interlocutor 
throughout low, precisely because, in addition to his setting of the terms that still regu-
late contemporary philosophy, he is the philosopher who first broached the problems of 
appearing and of subtractive ontology: ‘Kant is undoubtedly the creator in philosophy 
of the notion of object’ (244). moreover, Kant’s creation is rigorous and precise: ‘the 
subtractive rationality of Kantian ontology ends up placing the relation between an 
empty logical subject and an object that is nothing at the foundation of representation’ 
(to, 38). moreover:
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what is common to plato, to Kant and to my own attempt, is to state that the 
rational grasp of differences in being-there, or intra-mundane differences, is not 
deducible from the ontological identity of the existents concerned, because this 
identity tells us nothing of the localization of the existent (32).
nonetheless, the spider of Königsberg never arrived at badiou’s own ‘ontico-transcen-
dental synthesis’ of the gap between ‘the pure presentation of being in the mathematics 
of multiplicities on the one hand, and the logic of identity that prescribes the consistency 
of a world on the other’ (239). and yet, and yet….
against this ambivalent relation to Kant, we can array badiou’s altogether less trou-
bled relation to Hegel: ‘to my eyes in fact, there are only three crucial philosophers: 
plato, descartes, Hegel’ (552). in fact, the identification with Hegel is so strong that 
badiou will even declare: ‘Logics of  Worlds is to Being and Event what Hegel’s Phenomenol-
ogy of  Spirit is to his Science of  Logic, although the chronological orders are reversed: an 
immanent grasp of the givens of being-there, a local traversal of figures of the true and 
the subject, and not a deductive analytic of forms of being’ (6). a little later, badiou will 
displace this comparison again: ‘the “historic” companion to the present book is He-
gel, thinker par excellence of the dialectical correlation between being and being-there, 
between essence and existence. it is against his Science of  Logic that we measure ourself 
here’ (0). it’s Hegel over Kant, any day.
so badiou’s identification is overwhelmingly with Hegel. but in many ways his in-
tervention is far more Kantian than Hegelian. like Kant, badiou’s most striking phil-
osophical achievements have come relatively late in his career. this is not simply a 
biographical detail; after all, ‘age’ and ‘generation’ are integral to the disposition of 
philosophy (think, for example, of the relation between plato and socrates, or the ro-
mantic exaltation of the figure of ‘the child’). be was only published in 988, after a 
long succession of extraordinary works, such as ts (982), which remixed philosophy, 
psychoanalysis, political theory, and poetry in very odd ways. but ts is, in my opinion, 
a philosophical failure. it’s not that it’s not a brilliant book. its ambition, inventiveness, 
local apercus, and range of reference are staggering (if still restricted in comparison to 
be and low).
the point is that a book can be brilliant without being a genuine work of phi-
losophy. indeed, one of the things that makes philosophy unique is that is it sometimes 
even permitted to be ignorant and stupid. badiou’s oft-stated appreciation of ts has a 
merely personal flavour to it; the book does not necessarily deserve such approbation in 
itself, at least not as philosophy. so the question of the generation of be must, like the 
first Critique, entail a kind of maturation, that is, a leap and a rupture that is not merely a 
supersession. such ‘maturation’—i give it this obscene name in honour of Kant’s own 
definition of enlightenment as an exit from a self-imposed immaturity—must further 
recognize itself as a leap and a rupture, at the very moment that it retains within itself a 
trace of the confusions of infancy from which it emerged.35
35. in fact, disciples are often reactionary or obscurantist in the guise of fidelity. if you believe that such 
propositions as ‘badiou has always been interested in mathematics’ or ‘the key to badiou’s thought through-
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it is undoubtedly also significant that Kant, having seized the work of his maturity, 
starts to produce sequels: Critiques , 2, and 3 (pure reason, practical reason, and Judge-
ment). For this maturation also involves an act of radical self-restriction. like Kant’s 
great Critiques, badiou’s be period works exhibit a certain asceticism. this asceticism is 
both enacted and thematized in the restrained selection of targets, the style of writing, 
not to mention the concepts themselves. it’s no accident that one of badiou’s favourite 
slogans becomes the mallarméan one of ‘restrained action’. no less than the problem of 
maturity, the problem of asceticism is entirely immanent to the philosophical text.
like Kant—but unlike Hegel—badiou radically denies the existence of the whole, 
the all. Kant is in fact so radically opposed to such totality that he refuses to vitiate the 
rift between phenomenal and noumenal. at best, for Kant the idea of ‘totality’ must re-
main purely regulative. if there is ‘some of the one’, it’s subordinated to its inexistence, to 
irrecuperable division. For his part badiou, mounts one argument after another against 
the one. in both low and be, he provides nifty demonstrations derived from russell. 
what this inexistence of the whole in fact entails is a division of being and being-there. 
as badiou himself says, Kant is the beginning of subtractive ontology: ‘For the first time 
really, Kant was the one to shed light on the avenues of a subtractive ontology, far from 
any negative theology’ (to 39).36 to the extent that the Hegelian absolute is given any 
truck, it is as a foil for the true state of affairs: ‘like the Hegelian absolute, a world is 
the unfolding of its own infinity. but, in contrast to that absolute, it cannot construct in 
out is the dialectic’ norm be’s emphasis on conditions, then you are a reactionary. be is thereby figured 
simply an extension of a pre-existing situation, one in which the attempt to think the materialist dialectic 
is king. the equation mathematics = ontology is thus submitted to the dictates of an alleged ancien régime; 
on such a vision, be did not mark any real rupture at all. this view is tantamount to believing be is an 
adjustment to sustain a larger, ongoing program. it reduces be to an extension of categories that ‘were present 
from the start’, but without—the key point—acknowledging that they have been totally ‘recast’, ob, p. 5. 
Certainly, as ray brassier writes, ‘throughout badiou’s work, mathematics enjoys a privileged status as 
paradigm of science and of ‘‘scientificity’’ in general. this has been a constant, from his first significant 
philosophical intervention, the 966 article ‘the (re)Commencement of dialectical materialism’, notable 
for the way in which it already prefigures his subsequent (career-spanning) preoccupation with the rela-
tion between set-theory and category-theory, to his most recent work, wherein badiou finally establishes a 
philosophical connection between these two branches of mathematics by arguing that the doctrine of being, 
laid out via set-theory in Being and Event (988), needs to be supplemented by a doctrine of appearance that 
mobilizes category-theory, as badiou does in his forthcoming Logics of  Worlds’, ‘badiou’s materialist episte-
mology of mathematics’, Angelaki, vol. 0, no. 2, 2005, pp. 35-50. all this is absolutely true; but it would be 
false if one believes that this fact bears in any serious way upon the breach effected by be: before be, badiou 
(as he himself admits) was completely unable to give, in all its power and clarity, the unprecedented equa-
tion mathematics = ontology, and push it into the real. brassier himself is certainly not proposing that such a 
continuity trumps the breach, though others are….
36. on the necessity of division: ‘plato must separate himself from parmenides and identify thought other-
wise than by its pure coextension to being. descartes, by hyperbolic doubt, Husserl by the transcendental 
epoché, separate immanent reflexion from every position of the object. Kant, all at once, distinguishes 
thought (element in which transcendental philosophy proceeds) from knowledge (which determines par-
ticular objects). For my part, i distinguish speculative meta-ontology from mathematical ontology, and 
mathematical ontology from the logic of appearing. but, more essentially, i also distinguish thought (subjec-
tive figure of truths) and knowledge (predicative organization of truth effects)’, low, p. 253.
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interiority the measure, or the concept, of the infinity that it is’ (326).
Finally, like Kant, badiou insists that philosophy is entirely conditional. For both phi-
losophers, integral to the work of philosophy is the affirmation of the very conditions it 
depends upon; moreover, they both insist upon the conditions’ irreducible separation 
from one another, as well as their irreducible exteriority to philosophy. what else is the 
‘conflict of the faculties’ in Kant? what else is the ‘peace of the discontinuous’ in ba-
diou? the conditions are self-supporting in the peculiar way that i spoke about above 
(e.g., their verification is intrinsic to their practice). philosophy, by contrast, is not self-
supporting, being entirely reliant on these conditions. this is why so much of Kant’s 
text is dedicated to what seems to be an elaborate police operation: yet what is really 
at stake, as in the famous image of the dove, is that, unlike the bird itself, philosophical 
flight cannot ignore the resisting air which renders it possible. and this is why so many 
of badiou’s headings have to do with ‘metaontology’, ‘metapolitics’, and ‘inaesthetics’: 
the ‘ins’ and ‘metas’ are neither an index of superiority nor of negation, but the philo-
sophical stigmata of being conditioned.37
maturation, asceticism, division, condition: Kant and badiou, certainly radically 
different in so many ways, are nonetheless aligned according to these fundamental op-
erators. so badiou’s clear and conscious identification with Hegel not only falsifies his 
far more profound affiliations with Kant—but tempts him in low to vitiate some of 
the rigour of be (low reads very much more like ts than like anything else badiou 
has written post-988; that is, a philosophical omnivorum, a gargantuan rattle-bag of in-
teresting phenomena and brilliant aperçus).38 what are the problems that badiou’s total 
curiosity, not to mention his avowed identification with Hegel, and his disavowed iden-
tification with Kant, get him into?
Here are three problems that i see as deriving directly from the Kant-Hegel im-
broglio: ) the materialist dialectic; 2) the temptation of the whole; 3) the theory of 
change. these problems are all linked. symptomatically, one can see the return of triads 
throughout low. For example, the dialectic of presentation of the logic of the concept 
of body proceeds like this: ‘our trajectory can be summarized thus: subjective formalism 
(without object); object (without subject); objectivity of the subject (bodies)’ (205). then 
are the three forms of the subject (faithful, reactive, obscure), the three fundamental op-
erators of objectivity (localization, compatibility, order), the three themes of the grand 
logic (transcendental, object, relation) and so on. when you start dealing with triads, 
one bad guy is still the big boss, and that’s Hegel. even if you add a fourth strut to each, 
that is, as Zizek has often noted, Hegelian too.
37. ‘the words “inaesthetic,” “transitional ontology,” “metapolitics” are coined against “aesthetics,” “episte-
mology” and “political philosophy” respectively in order to indicate the twisted relation of the condition/
evaluation pairing, and, if possible, in order to deny oneself the temptation to rely on the reflection/object 
relation’, alain badiou, ‘preface to the english edition’, Metapolitics, trans. J. barker, london, Verso, 2005, 
p. xxxiii.
38. as a. J. bartlett has suggested to me, low might even be better considered a prequel rather than a sequel 
to be, given the number and intensity of low’s links to ts (private communication).
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For badiou, because there is no one, nothing binds the inconsistency of worlds. 
the problem is: how is it that, given the patency of incommensurables, a truth can be 
said to be ‘the same’? this is also the problem of time. For badiou, a truth-procedure 
must aim at the ‘present’, a present that is such only as a ‘future anterior’, and is, thereby, 
‘immortal’ (or ‘eternal’). the two issues are linked. take the little demonstration on 
prime numbers (8-25). Here badiou reiterates: 
must it be deduced that all is culture, including mathematics? that 
universality is only a fiction? and perhaps an imperialist, even totalitarian, 
fiction? From the same example we will, completely to the contrary, affirm: 
∙ that an eternal truth is enveloped in different linguistic and conceptual 
contexts (in what we will call, on the basis of book ii, different ‘worlds’); 
∙ that a subject of the same type finds itself implicated in the demonstrative 
procedure, whether it be greek or contemporary (whether it belongs to the world 
‘greek mathematics’ or to the world ‘mathematics after Cantor’)
 the key point is that the truth subjacent to the infinity of prime numbers is not 
so much this infinity itself as what is deciphered there regarding the structure of 
numbers: that they are all composed of prime numbers, which are like the ‘atomic’ 
constituents—indecomposable—of numericity (20-2).
this can only work if one takes mathematics to be one world, love another world, poli-
tics another, art yet another—and that these ‘worlds’ are not the ‘worlds’ we think of 
when we think ‘greek theatre’ or ‘modernist theatre’. against relativism (‘democratic 
materialism’), badiou has then, on the one hand, to affirm eternal truths; on the other 
hand, there is no totality, so worlds are really disjunct. the difficulty is then to explain 
how eternality can emerge from within a world, and how this eternality then communi-
cates between worlds: ‘i believe in eternal truths and in their fragmented creation in the 
present of worlds. my position on this point is completely isomorphic to that of des-
cartes: truths are eternal because they have been created, and not because they have 
been there forever’ (534). but this is to restate the problem in the guise of a conviction, 
supported, moreover, by an appeal to authority.
part of the difficulty is that it isn’t simply that a theory of change is lacking; it’s nice 
to have a more elaborate theory of world-transformation, sure, but such a theory only 
forces out the problem more clearly. i was impressed with the account given in be, as 
i am impressed with the different account of change (and the possibility of change) in 
low.39 but perhaps it isn’t enough. it’s that a really convincing concept of eternity is 
39. as oliver Feltham notes, be ‘can privide a theory of both the multiplicity of structures and contingent 
astructural change. what badiou’s philosophy adds is basically: ) the contingency of structural incom-
pleteness or instability: not every structure permits global change. 2) the possibility of anomalous events 
that occur in the register of the real, outside structure (they are not grounded in any external reality/con-
text), and which can initiate change if there are. 3) the elaboration of structural preconditions for transfor-
mation—someone recognizes and names the event as belonging to the situation…Finally, 4) a new way of 
thinking subjects of change, subjects who, over time, participate in the invention of a new symbolic order by 
means of hypotheses and enquiries concerning the belonging of the anomalous event to a structure’, ‘enjoy 
your stay : structural Change in seminar XVii’, in J. Clemens and r. grigg (eds.), Jacques Lacan and the Other 
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lacking. it seems to me the kernel of the problem is this: how to seize and present the 
historicity of  the eternity of  contingency, the fact that eternity emerges in worlds in time. Kant 
wouldn’t see the need to do it; Hegel could do it, but because he believed in the whole. 
it may well be a trap to think that a ‘materialist dialectic’, an account of ‘specificity’ 
routed through category theory, or a better typology of subjective variations is going 
to help with this deadlock. on the contrary, we have so much trouble thinking contin-
gency precisely because of  the ineluctability of  the dialectic. 
a resurrected truth—whether that of prime numbers or the depiction of horses—must 
leap the gap between heterogeneous worlds, but a truth can only be the truth of a world. 
it is this ‘sequelization’ of truth that i have not yet understood in low.
Vi. ConClusion
it may not be enough to pair the rigorous formal demonstrations with quasi-phe-
nomenological talk of battles and demonstrations and paintings. but only time will tell: 
i have never read anything quite like low before, and, given that it was officially pub-
lished barely a half-year ago (march 2006), i have been unable to find any substantial 
responses to it. none of the existing accounts have given the slightest evidence that they 
have so far dealt adequately with the formal logic, let alone with the real ambitions of 
the book. indeed, low will probably prove to be among the most ambitious and wide-
ranging works of philosophy of the 2st century. who else in contemporary philosophy 
anywhere in the world shares badiou’s range and depth of knowledge (mathematics, 
logic, philosophy, great moments in politics, key developments in contemporary music, 
the history of theatre, etc.), let alone the ability to articulate these knowledges in such 
an unprecedented fashion? 
still, i cannot see what’s at stake in affirming a ‘materialist dialectic’ today against 
‘democratic materialism’. these are terms from the struggles of a previous era, one that 
still held out hope for the whole, even in its negation or loss (e.g., ‘the whole is the un-
true’, ‘the end of metanarratives’, ‘anti-dialectics’, etc.). nothing intrinsic justifies this as a 
‘materialism’ (why not just call it a ‘realism’?), other than old fondnesses. idealism, mate-
rialism: this has become a distinction without difference in a world where foundational 
physics invents incommensurable and untestable string-theories that are nonetheless 
each consistent; where the legacy of political activism engages local struggles that hardly 
require any kind of doctrine or praxis of ‘materialism’ for their organization or effects. 
what’s in this ‘dialectic’ today that’s worth saving? what’s in this ‘materialism’ that’s not 
a mere slogan? low is certainly be2, a genuine sequel in the sense of which i spoke 
above. but it is in some fashion also a recoiling, a kind of return to the good old days 
of badiou’s pre-be struggles. so i think the guiding opposition that opens this book, 
between ‘democratic materialism’ and ‘materialist dialectics’ is misleading. the chal-
lenge is rather to surpass democracy, materialism and dialectics, without succumbing 
to fascism, idealism and lassitude. the slogan one might brandish instead is transliteral 
Side of  Psychoanalysis, durham, duke university press, 2006, p. 92. 
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absolutism.
i think this is what one should ask of philosophy: to identify, to announce, to har-
bour, to affirm, to practice the (or an) absolute. a philosophy can certainly domicile re-
gional theories within it; but it is itself not simply a theory, or agglutination of theories. 
nor can philosophy be reduced to a quasi-wittgensteinian ‘dissolution of false prob-
lems’, though dissolution can certainly sometimes in itself provide some kind of absolute. 
but the point is that true philosophy may require no theory at all. Just an absolute. an 
absolute, moreover, that can even be evanescent, infirm, indiscernible.
this is what an attention to the conditions of philosophy enabled badiou to do in be. 
badiou’s undoubted personal genius—evident from Le Concept de modèle to Peut-on penser la 
politique?—was curbed by conditions to produce the terrible beauty of be. there, there 
is no real rhetoric at all, as he is reduced to presenting the foundational interventions of 
other discourses, mathematics and poetry above all. be’s philosophical power derives 
from its platonic attention to the incommensurable absolutes and their articulation, 
which had to be done in a non-dialectical fashion. be is very explicit on this point: it is 
not logical negation, contradiction, antagonism, or other familiar philosophemes that 
are up to the mathematical thought of the foreclosure of the inconsistency of the void. 
it’s set theory, and set theory alone. moreover, it’s not just that badiou’s philosophical 
ambitions can only be fulfilled by being brutally curbed; rather, everyone’s ambitions 
are curbed as they are delivered into their secular eternity. plato is an absolute, but, 
coming before Cantor, must fail to think being as infinity, having to take recourse to the 
figure of a dream; rousseau is an absolute, who, despite his anti-philosophical tenden-
cies, forges an eternal distinction between the totality of wills and the general will.
all this can be done precisely because, in the terms that low offers, be largely 
restricts itself to a world, to a single world, the world of ontology (and to its fracturing 
through events). low, however, is about the logics (irreducibly plural) of worlds (also 
plural). it thus sets itself a task so grand that self-comparisons to Hegel aren’t going to 
cut it: in the last instance, low provides neither the unbearable ontological intrication 
of the Science of  Logic, nor the hallucinatory cavalcade of the Phenomenology of  Spirit. why? 
precisely because there is no whole for badiou, the worlds can be given no overarching 
arché, no principle, no absolute reason. what in be were not examples, in any sense of 
the word, but conditions, that is, the supports for the philosophical snatch and grab, in 
low turn once more into examples. to read low after be is to read a jumbled work 
of genius, teeming with inventiveness at all levels. but its genius can also seem tenden-
tious, precisely because its only restraint is to gesture towards possible exemplifications 
of the logical structure. what has happened to the absolutely central doctrine of such 
books as be and C, where philosophy’s ‘historically invariant’ definition involves the 
construction of a place in which science, love, art and politics can all encounter each 
other? is this still the case? in low, everything verges on a borgesian dream, moving, 
with a delirious energy, from prime numbers to cave paintings of horses to spartacus to 
contemporary music to….
so if low must be read, its propositions, even when irrefutable, often appear far 
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from absolute. nonetheless, it never gives up on what the stakes are today for philoso-
phy. these are, as i suggested above, to attain to a transliteral absolute by taking reason 
to the very points at which it breaks down and is transformed into something unprec-
edented. to literality, not materiality; to contingency, not sufficiency; to absolution, not 
dialectics; to submission, and not to surrender.
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